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The message of this paper is twofold: (a) the pursuit of territorial cohesion, the importance of which the
new European Constitution recognises, requires coordination of national planning systems; and (b)
subsidiarity, a Community principle usually invoked to counteract it, should instead become the principle
underlying a feasible and effective form of such coordination at the EU (European Union) level. Indeed,
the Constitution should at least encourage planners to discuss principles of good EU territorial
governance by addressing the performance of statutory planning systems in the common area of
territorial cohesion. In brief, these principles might be termed vertical subsidiarity, horizontal subsidiarity,
and the coordination between subsidiarity and cohesion.
European integration requires … also new mental maps and removal of  Cartesian
inhibitions. (Williams, , ‒)
Territory in the new Constitution for Europe
Discussions on voting systems, Member State representation and the number of
Commissioners have overshadowed innovations in the debate of  the European
Constitution (CRGMS, ). As explained in the introduction of  this special issue,
these innovations include the recognition of  the territorial dimension of  ‘cohesion’
(the Community principle introduced in the  Single European Act), which
perhaps more than any other represents the political will for European integration.
Subsequently, ‘Protocol No.  on economic and social cohesion’ was formally
approved as an addendum to the  Treaty on European Union.
The section entitled ‘Economic, social, and territorial cohesion’ (Articles III–
to III–) of  the new Constitution would substitute the current Title XVII
(‘Economic and social cohesion’, Articles  to ) of  the Treaty establishing the
European Community (EC Treaty). Without specifically mentioning territory, Article
 establishes that ‘the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the
levels of  development of  the various regions and the backwardness of  the least
favoured regions or islands, including rural areas’. For this purpose Article  states
that ‘Member States shall conduct their economic policies and shall coordinate them
in such a way as … to attain the objectives set out in Article ’, while the
Community pursues action ‘through the Structural Funds … the European Invest-
ment Bank and the other existing financial instruments’. In particular, the European
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Regional Development Fund (ERDF), being the most effective among these
instruments, ‘is intended to help to redress the main regional imbalances in the
Community through participation in the development and structural adjustment of
regions whose development is lagging behind and in the conversion of  declining
industrial regions’ (Article ).
The novelty of  the European constitutional project is not limited to the recogni-
tion of  ‘territorial’ cohesion policies, but extends to the institutional modalities of
such policies. In particular, Article III– announces possible ‘European laws or
framework laws’ which ‘may establish any specific measure outside the Funds,
without prejudice to measures adopted within the framework of  the Union’s other
policies’. Maybe it would require a constitutional expert to explain the concrete
potentialities and limits of  such an enunciation. However, planners may rightly
wonder about possible connections with provisions concerning environmental policy
(Articles III– and III–). There it is stated that ‘European laws or framework
laws’ may establish ‘measures affecting … town and country planning’ and even ‘land
use’, albeit ‘with the exception of  waste management’ (Articles III–). It is true that
an almost identical provision (which so far has not been invoked) is found in the
existing EC Treaty. But, this being a matter of  practical need and of  political
willingness, the reasons for territorial cohesion could perhaps modify the scenario.
Notwithstanding the uncertainties involved, the hope is that the Constitution
makes an important step towards affirming a Community competence for territorial
policy; a competence which, since its inception and in spite of  well-known difficulties
(Williams, ; Faludi et al., ; Husson, ), the European Community has
demonstrated that it cannot do without.
European integration, cohesion and territory
After the Single European Act () and the Treaty on European Union (), the
subsequent treaties of  Amsterdam () and Nice () strengthened European
integration. In addition to the constitutional project, this process culminated in the
adoption of  a common currency and in the enlargement, as of   May , of  the
EU to  members. At the root of  this immense effort, otherwise inconceivable only
slightly more than a century after the formation of  modern states, lies the desire for
prosperity (or even simple survival) in the face of  globalisation. It is worth recalling
the conclusion of  the Commission’s White Paper on the completion of  the internal
market, which inspired the Single European Act:
Just as the Customs Union had to precede Economic Integration, so Economic
Integration has to precede European Unity. To do less would be to fall short of  the
ambitions of  the founders of  the Community, incorporated in the Treaties; it would be
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to betray the trust invested in us; and it would be to offer the peoples of  Europe a
narrower, less rewarding, less secure, less prosperous future than they could otherwise
enjoy. That is the measure of  the challenge which faces us. Let it never be said that we
were incapable of  rising to it. (CEC, , )
The cohesion principle expresses nothing but a concern for rebalancing the
uncertain distributive effects of  an internal market without borders and, in so doing,
avoiding the pernicious risk of  Europe disintegrating. For this reason, as soon as
cohesion was agreed, and in spite of  formal objections, the implementation of
territorial and urban Community policies proved to be indispensable. With increased
efforts during the late s, European institutions and nation states found themselves
cooperating in various forms of  territorial governance generally under the flag of
‘European spatial planning’ (Williams, ; Faludi, ; Janin Rivolin, ).
First of  all, there was the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP)
(CEC, ; Faludi and Waterhout, ), ‘the proudest achievement so far of
European spatial planning’ (Faludi, , ). At present, European governments are
involved in the ‘application’ of  a common Action Programme on the ESDP (Faludi,
) providing among others for the operation of  the ‘European Spatial Planning
Observation Network’ (ESPON, ). (See the paper by van Gestel and Faludi on
the origins of  ESPON in this issue.)
The first of  the  actions in the Action Programme focuses on the need to
consider the ESDP in the implementation of  the Structural Funds. The relevant
resources, about  billion euro for the period – (approximately  per cent of
Community expenses), are expected to increase to  billion in –, partly due
to the enlargement of  the EU (CEC, a). So, the Structural Funds have been
rightly described as ‘the pot of  gold at the end of  the rainbow’ for European spatial
planning (Williams, , ). Since the introduction of  the cohesion principle, these
Structural Funds are a form of  ‘territorially oriented’ programming. A radical reform
in  has led to the standardisation of  procedures and the periodic identification of
‘priority objectives’ and ‘eligible zones’ (regions or municipalities) every six to seven
years.
The territorial orientation of  the Community Initiatives in the Structural Funds
framework has been even more evident. Since , they have enabled specific
actions to be taken by the Commission, using approximately – per cent of  the
Structural Funds to obtain results of  particular strategic Community significance. In
–, three initiatives out of  four (INTERREG III, Urban II and Leader+)
promote interventions in the regions and in cities, with a total Community investment
of  . billion euro, amounting to  per cent of  the total. The possibility to cancel the
Community Initiatives in the next programming period – (CEC, b) must
not be viewed as an about turn, but rather as an attempt to reshape the mainstream
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Structural Funds in the light of  the positive experiences so far. Convergence, regional
competitiveness and employment, and territorial cooperation are indeed the priority
objectives that the Commission has proposed for implementing ‘an effective cohesion
policy’, the main feature of  which is ‘its adaptability to specific needs and character-
istics of  territories’ (CEC, b, xxxi).
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of  European spatial planning is the overall
results, whether expected or unexpected, of  its implementation. Community urban
and territorial policies have been developed through complex and progressive
innovations in practice and in developing local, regional and national institutions for
territorial governance (Janin Rivolin, ; ; ). In other words, in order to
achieve concrete transformations, European territorial governance passes through and
modifies the complex prism of  institutionalised planning (Janin Rivolin and Faludi,
).
If  this is true, then the ‘European framework laws’ for territorial cohesion policy
envisaged may imply more than a first perusal would seem to suggest. The point is to
get an understanding of  the effects of  territorial cohesion policy, rather than merely
to measure them periodically (CEC, a; a; b). This applies not only to
Community institutions, but to all public authorities which, whether they appreciate it
or not, have already participated in this policy and have been progressively
transformed by it. In this light, a shared framework of  Community principles of  good
territorial governance may prove to be a good way to exploit the new opportunities
offered by the European Constitution.
Planning, subsidiarity and effectiveness of public action
The so-called ‘competence issue’ of  whether or not to attribute a territorial
competence to Community institutions was not purely academic. The issue has been
discussed several times and, even though inconclusive, the debate since the middle of
the s has been heated (Husson, ; Faludi and Waterhout, , –). In
brief, the issue comes down to whether supranational planning makes sense, in
particular in view of  the fact that some countries have already been experimenting
with decentralising planning. Prominent examples of  these countries include France,
Great Britain, Italy, Portugal and Spain (whereas planning in Belgium, Finland,
Germany and Sweden is traditionally decentralised). Since the variety of  planning
systems in Europe is great, it is difficult to give a definite answer. The attempt to
classify different planning systems into four models (a ‘regional-economic approach’
of  the French matrix, the ‘comprehensive-integrated approach’ of  the German
matrix, the British ‘land use management approach’ and the Mediterranean
‘urbanism tradition’) in The EU Compendium of  Spatial Planning Systems and Policies (CEC,
b, –) represents just an initial effort.
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What is relevant here is that the ‘subsidiarity’ principle, being an integral part of
the EC Treaty, is now recognised as one of  the ‘Fundamental principles’ (Article I–)
in the Constitution:
Under the principle of  subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence the Union shall act only if  and insofar as the objectives of  the intended
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or
at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of  the scale or effects of  the
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. (Article I–, c. )
Up to now, the subsidiarity principle has played into the hands of  the opponents
of  Community planning. The argument is that Member States and a sub-national
level of  government can do the job adequately; there is thus no reason for extending
this competence to the Community. However, now that territorial cohesion policy has
entered the scene, it should be seen as a distinctive matter from statutory planning in
the  European countries (Faludi, ). Nonetheless, could territorial cohesion
policy in isolation from statutory planning be effective? One could indeed argue that
the constitutional recognition of  territorial cohesion as an objective of  the Union
implicitly means that even statutory planning is no longer an exclusive matter of  the
Member States. In fact, it is worth considering how cohesion and subsidiarity relate to
each other under the European Constitution. From this perspective, the development
of  European spatial planning and the decentralisation of  planning powers become
two sides of  the same coin. Since it relates to territory, cohesion policy will be
implemented primarily through the medium of  local planning. It is not by accident
that local responsibility as an alternative to the twentieth-century welfare-state model
of  public action, which moreover finds itself  in a long-term crisis, is one of  the basic
principles of  the White Paper on ‘European Governance’ (CEC, b). In other
words, the substantive principle of  territorial cohesion does not appear to be in conflict
with, but rather supported by, the procedural one of  subsidiarity as a safeguard of  the
effectiveness of  public action in times of  globalisation.
European integration may, therefore, once more become a stimulus for developing
national traditions. In particular, the pursuit of  territorial cohesion would require an
evolution of  statutory planning systems historically based, according to the traditional
welfare-state model, on insistence on the conformance of  local transformations to
centralised decisions (i.e. a predominant hierarchy from central to local plan and from
strategies to projects). In its stead, the pursuit of  performance would be appropriate to
planning systems oriented to the governance of  territorial transformations (Faludi,
).
This leads to the conclusion that, rather than separating the  European
planning systems from territorial cohesion policy, subsidiarity may lead to articulating
a framework of  territorial governance principles shared by all of  them.
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Instituting European territorial governance
Based on the above, one may expect ‘European laws or framework laws’ which,
following the Constitution, may relate to territorial cohesion and affect town and
country planning, embracing three key principles for national planning to follow:
• vertical subsidiarity;
• horizontal subsidiarity; and
• coordination between subsidiarity and cohesion.
These might constitute the ‘minimum standards for spatial development policy’
(Ritter, 2003, 9), referred to in a recent position paper of  the German Academy for
Regional Research and Regional Planning, known by its German acronym as the
ARL, concerning spatial development policy in the European Constitution (see also
Faludi, 2004). The paper argues for such minimum standards for two very good
reasons:
First, a European spatial policy that is based on the principle of  cooperation can only
be created in any meaningful form if  all Member States contribute their ideas on
spatial policy. And second, states completely foregoing any kind of  spatial policy
control in their own territory – or which exercise such control only on a marginal basis
– would have an unfair advantage in intra-European competition. (Ritter, , )
The paper by Tewdwr-Jones and Mourato in this issue also emphasises the
importance of this topic.
Vertical subsidiarity
Vertical subsidiarity is the principle concerning the ‘re-scaling of  urban governance
in the European Union’ in times of  globalisation (Brenner, , ; see also
Swyngedouw, ). Vertical subsidiarity pertains to the relations between levels of
territorial governance and, therefore, also the relations between plans and programmes
on various scales (see Fig. ). Apart from recognising the scales of  planning in the
Member States (local, provincial/regional and national), a Community law should
formalise objectives, tools and procedures for strategic interventions identified
recently in relation to specific EU objectives (cross-border, transnational and supra-
national).
There would be scope here for a shared framework to develop various planning
tools as well as autonomous and joint competencies of  the responsible institutional
actors. Essentially, the agreed principle of  subsidiarity would constitute the rationale
upon which the vertical relationships between planning tools and competencies are
based, generally aiming at simplification and a common terminology. Subsidiarity
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would require above all that regulatory land use powers in all European countries be
the exclusive reserve at the local level (where necessary subject to exceptions),
assigning higher-level institutions other tasks such as the formulation of  general
policies and overall territorial strategies, into which local policies may fit, but which
are subject to the ‘performance’ principle as discussed above.
Horizontal subsidiarity
Horizontal relations in planning are usually seen as a matter of  coordinating sectoral
policies (see Schäfer elsewhere in this issue). Here the concept of  horizontal
subsidiarity implies an authentic sharing of  governance perspectives, concerning
primarily the relations between public and non-public actors. After all, attention to
governance leads to new ways of  conceptualising the interactions between these
actors, and in the case of  planning also between individual projects and overall
strategies. Indeed, facing the challenges of  globalisation, cities in Europe have shown
that ‘private actors (individual and collective) are increasingly salient in the
governance of  cities’ (Le Galès, , ). However, this does not mean that public
powers are subservient to private interests. Rather,
seeing in a public–private partnership a substitute for local government and/or
negotiated relations between social groups, community organisations, local councils
and employers’ organisations, as is sometimes suggested in some accounts of  new
Supranational
Transnational
National
Regional and interregional
Cross-border planning
Local planning
Figure 1 Typology of scales of EU spatial planning
Source: Tewdwr-Jones and Williams, 2001.
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urban governance, is grossly misleading and not even fully accurate. (Le Galès, ,
; see also Camagni, )
It is worth emphasising that recent experiences in European spatial planning have
contributed decisively to the appreciation of  the need for these relationships between
plans and projects to be governed by the performance rather than the conformance
principle (Faludi, ). It follows that by its very nature the challenge posed by the
matter of  European competence of  territorial cohesion lies in its cultural significance
(in terms of  political as well as expert culture). The challenge may be faced
successfully to the extent that we are able to accept that subsidiarity must extend to
the ‘horizontal’ relations between individual projects and overall strategies (see Fig. ).
In concrete terms, attributing performing capacities to planning appears possible,
provided that the prescriptive powers are limited to regulating existing uses and rights,
without affecting the ‘visioning’ of  transformations. Such visioning would continue to
be legitimate and rightly pursued by each institution through non-binding
programmes and strategies, effective in so far as they are capable of  involving and
channelling local planning capacities.
Relinquishing institutional power to prescribe the future of  cities is not only a
matter of  intellectual honesty, but also has added value for planning practice. Current
planning systems have been under persistent criticism for operating according to the
conformity principle of  transformations to prescribed provisions, which tend to have
Figure 2 Vertical and horizontal relations and the coordination between subsidiarity cohesion in
planning
Land use
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strategies
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limited and often perverse effects. In today’s Europe, on a continental as well as a
local scale, visions of  territorial and urban transformations can be achieved without
resorting to the use of  law. Rather, they require reliable strategies and programmes
that are shared between the relevant actors. However, such collective strategies may
on the one hand be obstructed, or at least impeded, by projects legitimated by
previously acquired transformation rights. On the other hand, pursuing them can
imply the need for projects that are effectively capable of  achieving the expected
results (and only subsequently being assigned the relative transformation rights).
The coordination between subsidiarity and cohesion
The persistence of  institutions and planning practices founded upon the
conformance principle of  technocratic traditions can be explained by the concern,
sometimes authentic but nevertheless misdirected, to safeguard the implementation
of  coherent plans. This concern is not only legitimate but also indispensable, if  we
believe that planning continues to be (even within a framework of  relationships
founded on subsidiarity) a government activity justified by public concerns. It is one
thing to maintain that subsidiarity implies giving up the power to prescribe territorial
transformations, but quite another to conclude the corollary, unacceptable in the
contexts of  a market democracy, that individual projects can substitute for collectively
decided strategies. This corollary, equivalent to confusing subsidiarity with autarchy,
is gaining support among experts and decision makers who, curiously enough, tend to
apply it by exploiting, instead of  repudiating, the principle of  conformity.
The opposite is the case. In territorial politics, as in any public practice, collective
strategies are not the sums of  individual projects, much as a plan at a higher scale is
not based on juxtaposing lower-order plans. Rather, compared with overall plans,
individual projects and local plans are often shown to be in conflict with each other.
So in terms of  territorial governance the problem of  the relation between subsidiarity
and cohesion touches upon both vertical and horizontal relations. This is because
conflicts are common between plans or programmes at similar or different scales, and
between local projects or between them and the relevant plans. Seen in this light,
cohesion may guarantee, within a framework of  relationships founded on subsidiarity,
the prerogatives of  public authorities to guide territorial transformations according to
regulations and strategies shared by the Community.
More particularly, in a European system of  territorial governance founded upon
vertical and horizontal subsidiarity, ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’ could
become the constitutional principle on which public authorities, at whichever level of
government, base the resolution of  conflicts in planning practice. To the extent
feasible though, European legislation should establish simple but clear compensation
clauses for collective and individual interests that are suffering losses due to territorial
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transformations. Any planning decision is inherently discriminatory, which leads to a
simultaneous process of  ‘expansion’ and ‘exclusion’ (Plotkin, ). Discrimination
can affect both individual as well as collective interests. There is insufficient
opportunity for representing various interests and the good intentions of  collabora-
tive planning promoters is not enough (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, ).
Hence, some forms of  compensation of  the interests concerned is the only guarantee
that the distributive effects of  planning take account of  economic, social and territorial
cohesion.
Although an appropriate form of  institutionalisation still has to be found, some
kind of  Community compensation clause applying to planning systems would
facilitate public choices concerning the daily conflicts occurring in planning at every
scale, from the local to the supranational level. Additionally, this would allow
decisions to be based on technical evaluations, since these would be relieved not only
of  the burden of  prescriptive transformation visions, but also possible moral or
ideological concerns with regard to distributive effects. Thus, an indirect but perhaps
not negligible result of  Community regulation of  territorial governance would be to
redirect the attention of  European planners towards managing the relations between
spatial, social and economic configurations.
For understandable historical reasons, the absence in national constitutions of  any
requirement for planning to consider the need for Community solidarity is a fact.
Indeed, we may assume that safeguarding property rights and the pursuit of  an all-
too-generic concept of  the ‘public interest’ are the constitutional principles on which
national planning systems are based. Economic, social and territorial cohesion may
thus represent constitutional grounds for providing, within planning, equitable and
efficient compensation of  the various interests involved. Moreover, compensating
losing parties seems the most concrete way to eradicate the seminal conflict between
cohesion and subsidiarity. As indicated, up to now this conflict has prevented Euro-
pean territorial governance from receiving institutional recognition that is vital for the
future of  Europe.
Conclusions
These considerations are born out of  the realisation that, under the Constitution for
Europe, ‘European laws or framework laws’ may relate to territorial cohesion policy
as well as to town and country planning. Albeit subject to various interpretations as to
its practical significance, at a minimum, this means that European institutions have
taken steps towards acknowledging that a Community planning competence is
necessary for the European project to succeed (Husson, ). A crucial issue in this
paper has been whether and how a Community planning competence should interact
with national planning systems.
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The prevailing position is that it should not, and that, in view of  the subsidiarity
principle, statutory planning should remain the responsibility of  Member States.
Statutory planning is, of  course, the only institutional power for implementing local
transformations. So, looking at the elementary premise that any territorial policy is
implemented through local actions, it is relevant to ask how, in the absence of  institu-
tional interactions with national planning systems, Community territorial cohesion
policy is expected to be effective.
For this reason this paper argues that statutory planning systems based on the
conformance of  local transformations to centralised decisions, in both vertical
(regional/local plans) and horizontal (overall strategies/individual projects) directions,
counteract territorial cohesion. Conformance planning may have been viable under a
traditional welfare-state model, but under contemporary conditions it has proven to
be increasingly ineffective, if  not perverse. On the other hand, globalisation has led to
the emergence, especially in Europe, of  progressive forms of  territorial governance
(Brenner, ; Bagnasco and Le Galès, ; Camagni, ; Swyngedouw, ).
Of  course, the Community principle of  subsidiarity also expresses the need for good
European governance (CEC, b).
For these reasons, there is no inherent conflict between adopting subsidiarity and
the coordination of  national planning systems through European laws of  territorial
cohesion policy. Such laws would not in the least aspire to guide local transformations.
Rather, they would simply establish new Community constitutional principles,
especially subsidiarity and cohesion, within the institutional contexts of  planning in
Europe. In particular, subsidiarity should guide both vertical and horizontal relations
in planning practices, while economic, social and territorial cohesion would be
regarded as the constitutional reference point for resolving conflicts. In concrete
terms, this means Community institutions and Member States agreeing that
everywhere in Europe
• regulatory land use powers are a matter exclusively for local planning;
• these are limited to regulating existing uses and rights, without affecting visions of
future transformations; and
• some compensation clauses are instituted, protecting collective and individual
interests adversely affected by territorial transformations.
Laws are generally said to confirm existing procedures rather than establish new
ones. Indeed, rapidly spreading territorial governance practices, inspired among
others by Community innovations being appreciated by experts and decision makers
across Europe, face an uphill struggle to gain acceptance in attempts to reform
national (and regional) institutions based upon hierarchical twentieth-century
constitutional models. Notwithstanding attempts to reform them, existing laws and
instruments not only appear incapable of  adequately serving the emerging needs of
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performance in planning but, as indicated, they also appear to obstruct them. It is not
by accident that the innovative ideas of  this process of  change received most attention
in recent years. These ideas could be implemented incrementally everywhere
throughout Europe by enlightened operators and decision makers in attempts to
make territorial governance practices functional, even within inadequate institutional
contexts.
However, with the emergent challenges that Europe faces, creative innovation
risks becoming a grotesque consolation for noble souls or, even worse, an easy pretext
for promoting hidden interests in an uncertain context. The conclusion is that the
institution of  a Community planning competence is therefore not the necessary
objective of  a possible European law to apply territorial cohesion. It is, if  anything,
the means of  conferring institutional recognition on practices of  good territorial
governance which are already being experimented with but might otherwise be
destined to be great exceptions or remembered simply as good intentions. Unless the
inclusion of  territorial cohesion has been a mistake committed by the makers of  the
European Constitution (which is always possible, but this would be another story),
exceptions and good intentions are no longer sufficient.
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